The Internets

In looking at the anger of common people from Bahrain to Tunisia, Western journalists were confronted with a fundamental question. It was clear that these citizens were as mad as hell — but about what exactly were they as mad as hell? Is it discontent with the current government, religious strife, ethnic conflict, tribal violence - a power grab, a civil war or a good old-fashioned revolution? Without a good explanation as to what was happening, most Western journalists have started discussing the answer to another question: How is this revolution occurring? Their answer: the Internet.

In the West, we tend to think of the Internet as more than just another piece of technology. We assume it is revolutionary. In the latest spin on what I call the McDonald’s theory of international relations — that countries that accept our economic values will accept our political values as well — we have begun to elevate the Internet as the great democratizer. Wherever it goes, it brings Western values.

Nowhere was the mythologizing of the Internet more potent than in the coverage of Egypt. Western newspapers spilled barrels of ink trying to extol Wael Ghonim, the young Google executive who helped build many of the social networking sites associated with the revolution.

In writing about Ghonim, the Wall Street Journal’s Gordon Crovitz invoked a comparison between the role of social media in the Egyptian Revolution and the role of Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense” in the American Revolution. “It’s already clear that social media via the Web is unprecedented and unpredictable,” Crovitz wrote. “For authoritarian leaders used to controlling media and events, time and technology are not on their side.”

This sort of statement passes for common sense these days: The Internet will inevitably lead to the end of authoritarian regimes.

The New York Times’ The Lede Blog took this enthusiasm a step further. After Mubarak’s resignation, the blog ecstatically quoted Ghonim as saying, “Whoever has the most successful campaign on Facebook will be the head of the next parliament.” Just as the Internet has changed the way we do American politics, it seems natural that it will change the way Egyptians do politics. The Internet itself will bring Western values.

Perhaps. But we should be skeptical.

First, there is reason to doubt whether the Egyptian protesters used the Internet as the major medium for communication. Mubarak cut off Internet access to the entire country for five days starting on Jan. 28. If the Internet were actually the major tool of the revolution, this step would have been a big blow. But the protests continued and Mubarak was gone within two weeks.

In explaining how the revolution continued after the Internet was shut down, one Egyptian blogger told PBS, “The Egyptians are the original social networkers.” Certainly, these non-cyber forms of communication played a key role. It would seem that mosques and other communal areas probably played a more central role in facilitating communication. After all, protesters typically streamed out into the streets not after checking their computers, but rather after finishing their afternoon prayer.

Second, Mubarak’s ability to cut off the Internet raises a more fundamental question. Is it actually true that the Internet is a regime-buster? In an analysis of the WikiLeaks cables, The New York Times quoted a source inside the Chinese government that reported that a state-produced report had concluded the unthinkable: “The Web is fundamentally controllable.” Mubarak’s ability to shut down Internet access for 20 million people in a matter of minutes suggests that the Chinese view is not without merit. Is it possible that there are in fact different Internets — some that are controllable and some that are not?

Over 40 years ago, Gil Scott-Heron gave voice to the belief that technology was a tool of the elite when he sang that “the revolution will not be televised.” Now, we’ve come full circle by arguing that technology itself — in particular, the Internet — is the revolution. But this argument seems to be more a myth than a fact. And if we are going to have a shot at understanding this rapidly changing world, it’s best we see things as they are.

Adam Bradlow is an anthropology major from Potomac, Md. He can be reached at abradlow@princeton.edu.