Immigration and hospitality

As you might have guessed, I have just tried to frame the urgent issue of immigration reform in a way that makes the moral issue seem more tractable than the political debate in the United States suggests: Both Republicans and Democrats seem mired in controversies regarding the treatment of illegal aliens but apparently agree on the need for “secure borders.” However, as the analogy above suggests, it seems morally questionable to avert our eyes from global hardship while salving our guilt with a trickle of alms and avoiding radical changes.

Funnily enough, many activist groups concerned about the inherent challenge to the rule of law posed by the widespread presence of illegal immigrants rarely promote the most obvious response to the issue: allowing more immigrants to enter legally. This is despite the fact that the arguments opposing this humane policy pale against its primary benefit: that it would mitigate the global disparities in privilege and opportunity based on arbitrary luck of draw in the birthplace lottery.

A common objection is that more liberal immigration comes at a cost both to the sending and the receiving country. For the latter, the labor market competition from migrants is alleged to drive down wages for low-skilled native workers or “take their jobs.” However, immigrants have very different skills from most Americans, and as a result of productivity gains from complementarity, there are countervailing positive effects for employers, investors, land owners and consumers.

For some developing countries, on the other hand, the fear of a “brain drain” exists — the stifling of development by the exodus of the best and brightest. However, some of the sparse evidence on the effects of emigration on the country of origin suggests that remittances, trade and investment gains are larger than any positive externalities which might result from the migrants’ remaining at home. Moreover, evidence suggests that the possibility of later emigration raises the incentive to get an education in order to become a “drainable brain.” By that mechanism, the number of skilled workers in developing countries actually increases on aggregate as a result of migration. Moreover, note that we have not even considered the enormous income gains experienced by the migrants themselves, which surely matters from a humanitarian standpoint.

A commonly cited concern is that immigrants might free ride on the health care and social security systems of their host country. However, in reality the average immigrant in the United States is actually a net taxpayer. Due to their relative youth, immigrants’ contributions to the social security system are smaller than their receipts, as old-age programs dwarf welfare transfers. Furthermore, more liberal immigration laws might save costs by freeing up some of the expenditures on law enforcement, deportation and intensive border control.

To illustrate the urgency of this issue, imagine yourself — smart and ambitious — as a poor citizen of a least-developed country of your choice (Sudan or the Congo are recommended for the more adventurous readers). How would you feel about not only being denied a proper education, a safe home, adequate health care, etc., in your own country, but also being kept from productively making a living in another country because of the geographic location of your first screams?

At this point of the discussion, beware the objection from extreme outcomes: “But then billions of poor people of the world would come to the United States and that is surely not possible.” Two responses are in order. While the United States has historically proven one of the more successful cultural potluck parties, it is unlikely that in a free-immigration world the other 32 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development would not have some appeal to migrants (Paris or Trenton? Tough call!). Moreover, not all people will be swayed by economic opportunities to leave their home countries.

Furthermore, there are balancing forces that will prevent excessive migration into or out of any region in particular: In the same way that cost and quality of life, wage differentials, and idiosyncratic environmental preferences prevent overcrowding within the United States in any one attractive city, migrants would respond to incentives globally and domestically. That is, negative consequences of immigration could never reach beyond a certain threshold, as migration to other countries would simply be more attractive at that point — among other things via improvements in governance in developing countries themselves. Faced with the threat of depopulation, corrupt governments might find themselves forced to allow institutional changes and promote development in order to entice at least a part of their dwindling population to stay.

To conclude, the moral intuition against the perpetuation of birth-based privileges seems to hold up to scrutiny. Any opposition to more liberal immigration laws should face a steep uphill battle if the arguments are based on facts, not fears.

Gregor Schubert is an economics major from Leipzig, Germany. He may be reached at gregors@princeton.edu.