The North Korean nuclear crisis and Sino-U.S. relations

In 2005, 2007 and again in U.N. Security Council resolutions of April and June 2009, a multilateral understanding was reached that clarified what had become a new context for talks. In return for a softening of the U.S. position and reliance on China to continue moderating the six-party talks, China would intensify its efforts to bring Kim Jong-il to the negotiating table and harden its position on U.N. sanctions. With alliance ties with South Korea and Japan also at stake and Russian cooperation with the North, the nuclear crisis had become an urgent security problem affecting regional stability. The problem grew more urgent in early 2009, when the North insisted that it must be recognized as a nuclear power followed by a half year of bellicose rhetoric and behavior. As Obama prepares to make his first trip as president to East Asia in November, this issue has the potential to set the tone for each of his visits and even undermine his regional agenda. It is a test, above all, of Sino-U.S. ties.

As most eyes focus on the Afghan-Pakistan or Iraq-Iran theaters, North Korea seems to be of secondary significance. Yet there are at least three reasons why we must take it more seriously. First, it has enormous destructive capacity: nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, a substantial build-up of missiles, a menacing posture toward U.S. allies South Korea and Japan, and an unparalleled record of proliferation. Second, if the North proceeds with its nuclear weapons programs, this sets a precedent for Iran. Only by drawing a firm line in the first case can the international community show its seriousness toward the next emerging nuclear threat. Third, North Korea has become defined as the foremost test of Sino-U.S. security cooperation. If this should fail, the result could be a downward spiral in the single most important great power relationship.

China stands at a crossroads, more cooperative with the United States in recent years but also more assertive in blaming other states for interfering on matters affecting Tibet and Xinjiang. As a socialist state and long-time ally as well as buffer against U.S. alliances, North Korea has special meaning for China not only in realist terms but also in national identity terms. Chinese foreign policy from a national identity perspective shows a pervasive concern about the spread of values that could challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and re-emergent sinocentric ideas about the regional order. No less important than what we learn from this crisis about North Korean intentions is what this crisis reveals about where China is heading. Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit earlier this month to Pyongyang offering secret economic incentives to North Korea is a worrisome indication to South Korea, Japan and the United States that China’s help will be limited in solving this crisis.

With four great powers, Northeast Asia has been the intersection of clashing notions of international order since at least the Korean War. After three decades of biding its time as its economy grew stronger, China is poised to press for leadership in shaping a new regional order. It has succeeded in drawing Russia closer. It keeps trying to persuade Japan to agree to regionalism exclusive of the United States. It welcomed South Korean resistance to U.S. reasoning about the region before conservative Lee Myung-bak shifted his country closer to the United States. Yet the foremost barometer of intentions will be China’s handling of the dangerous, destabilizing plans of North Korea, a state that has often defied China. Given the fact that China does not want a nuclear North Korea and generally favors more cooperation with the United States, many expected a positive response to Obama’s balanced approach offering incentives to the North. China still has an opportunity to put to rest the doubts that have been mounting about its intentions.

Gilbert Rozman is the Musgrave Professor of Sociology. He teaches SOC 307: National Identities and Great Powers. He can be reached at grozman@princeton.edu.