The real reason for war: Control of precious territory

In a recent column I questioned the "moral clarity" now used as a cloak for a preemptive strike on Iraq. My argument was not with the war itself, on whose merit honorable people certainly can disagree honorably. My argument was with the chronic hypocrisy among seasoned adults. Why can't the erstwhile "realists" of the 1980s who now orchestrate this war frankly admit that it is fought chiefly for U.S. control over arguably the most precious piece of real estate in the Middle East? What has happened to honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned, time-hallowed "Realpolitik?"

Can we at least agree that the charade in the United Nations over inspections has been merely a vaguely amusing attempt to gain the U.N.'s "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" for a U.S. led war that was preordained long ago? Read in this regard the dicta of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, of late an increasingly strident proponent of a war on Iraq. "The war has two purposes — one stated and one unstated," he writes on Feb. 5, 2003, flush with insight from a round of visits with Bush administration officials. The stated goal, he goes on, is to disarm Iraq. The unstated goal, in his words, is the "longterm U.S. occupation of Iraq — under Gen. Tommy Franks — à la the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan. Iraq will be controlled by the iron fist of the U.S. Army and its allies, with an Iraqi civilian "advisory" administration gradually emerging behind this iron fist to run daily life and produce an Iraqi self-governing authority." The latter, of course, would be expected to support American foreign policy, just as Americans now expect the leaders of Germany's democracy faithfully to support American policy, regardless of what the German people may think of it.

Whether a preemptive strike on Iraq will make the United States safer or less safe from terrorist attacks remains a matter of debate among experts. There can be no question, however, that as a real-estate proposition a war on Iraq is compelling.

First, with the military presence required by an iron-fist occupation of Iraq, the United States can more easily dominate, punish, liberate or occupy recalcitrant countries all the way from Algeria to India, without having to ask Turkey or Saudi Arabia for permission to use their lands as staging areas for military strikes.

Second, the United States undoubtedly will have powerful influence over oil-production levels in Iraq even without taking possession of Iraq's huge oil reserves. No longer will Washington have to curtsy before Saudi Arabia to keep oil prices at desired levels. As the Financial Times (Feb. 11, 2003) reports, "the Russian economy — and the Kremlin's tax revenues — depend critically on [world] oil prices staying above $18 a barrel." Influence over oil-production levels in Iraq thus may yield Washington subtle but powerful diplomatic leverage over Russia. Further diplomatic leverage resides in the oil concessions an occupied Iraq will offer oil companies in other nations (England: "Yes;" France: "Maybe;" Germany: "No way").

Third, as former CIA senior analyst on Iraq Stephen C. Pelletiere recently pointed out in a fascinating essay in The New York Times (Jan. 31, 2002), Iraq controls large flows of fresh water (the Tigris, Euphrates, Greater and Lesser Zab rivers). That precious water, argues Pelletiere, can be commoditized and profitably marketed throughout the region, as far away as Israel, where water has long been of greater concern than real estate per se.

Finally, in his "How Israel Is Wrapped Up In Iraq" Joe Klein of Time magazine (Feb. 10, 2003) points to a rationale for the war "that dare not speak its name." Klein writes that the "neo-conservative faction" in the Bush administration dreams of a domino effect under which other, nondemocratic Muslim nations in the region will look to a liberated Iraq as a beacon and throw off their various yokes, possibly with help from the United States and its allies. "In the wackiest scenario," writes Klein, "it will lead to the collapse of the wobbly Hashemite monarchy in Jordan and the establishment of a Palestinian state on that nation's East Bank." Time will tell whether this scenario is as wacky as Klein believes.

As I mentioned in my earlier commentary, it is possible to spin this scenario as a giant, selfless, moral crusade. Evidently some folks feel more comfortable doing so. As a political economist, I am more impressed by the purely economic and political opportunities the war offers to American interests, perhaps because I have seen "moral clarity" put to too many diverse uses in my time. The argument that the net economic burden of the war on the U.S. economy ipso facto speaks of a higher moral purpose melts away on further reflection about the nature of American politics and the redistribution of economic privilege that the war on Iraq is likely to trigger within the United States.