Iraq: War is the best option

In 50 years, only two states have actively pursued nuclear weapons, brutally repressed their citizens and repeatedly committed acts of aggression against other sovereigns. Possessed of 20,000 nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union fell only after decades of conventional wars and a frightening nuclear standoff. Sitting on untold numbers of weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein's Iraq remains a threat to world peace.

Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons is a matter of historical record. Absent attacks by Israel in 1981 and a U.S.-led coalition in 1991 it would currently have the nuclear and delivery capability of India, the ambitions of al-Qaeda, the geopolitical importance of Saudi Arabia and a dictatorial structure whose imbalances are unrivaled.

It is here that critics of regime change have missed the boat. Focus should be shifted from Iraq's potential use of nuclear weapons to the dangers arising if it merely acquires them.

With domestic uranium deposits, this is only a matter of time, for Saddam Hussein needs no foreign assistance but only to develop a uranium enrichment facility — not very difficult technologically — in order to acquire nuclear capabilities. Once this threshold has been crossed, the power balance in the Middle East will have shifted irreversibly. A nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein would certainly engage in limited wars of regional aggression to achieve his long-stated goal of regional domination — and the U.S. could do little but sit on the sidelines, itself deterred from action as it is currently with North Korea.

Consider: In response to clearcut Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1991, the United States amassed an international coalition with great difficulty, both at home and abroad. Would any member of the U.N. endorse the same response today if Iraq possessed a second-strike nuclear capability? What if the target of Saddam's nuclear threats were Saudi Arabia? Israel?

Placed in a region where severe disruption of energy production would bring the global economy to its knees, it seems clear that Iraq's possession of nuclear weapons is an unacceptable contingency from virtually any strategic framework.

The United States, in turn, faces a three-pronged decision tree: deterrence, containment, or regime change. Inaction is not an option.

Deterrence has at least three weaknesses. First, it presupposes a rational opponent, but fails to distinguish between the rationality of individuals and the states in which they operate. Brutal regimes notoriously facilitate misinformation — Saddam hears only what his cadre of elites thinks he wants to hear — resulting in highly adventurous and non-rational state behavior. Think of Saddam's decision during the Gulf War to launch a concrete-tipped Scud at Israel's Dimona reactor which, had it struck with greater accuracy, would have been tantamount to launching a nuclear weapon. Second, nuclear deterrence for the purpose of protecting regional allies has always been problematic, as the credibility of U.S. threats diminishes when American lives are not at stake. Finally, deterrence cannot account for the terrorism wild card, the likelihood that Iraq will encourage sub-state networks to do dirty work on its behalf without a return address.

Containment would be — or, more precisely, has been — equally ineffective. Rigorous sanctions regimes and swarms of U.N. inspectors have been in place for over a decade. They have been unequivocal failures. If "Hans Blix, Ph.D." is the answer, we certainly hope the question is not "How can we disarm a murderous, genocidal dictator bent on acquiring nuclear weapons?"

As for experts recommending more coercive inspections, they are committing the United States to a gradual escalation of hostilities, an approach that harkens back to the mistakes of Vietnam. This strategy also requires the unattractive prospect of permanently maintaining a large conventional force deployment in states in which it is unwelcome. Ultimately, the error of containment advocates is their supposition that Saddam might, after 12 years, fully cooperate with international authorities. The record indicates this will not happen.

That leaves only one option: regime change. No administration undertakes a war of this magnitude lightly, but the imperative of preventing acquisition of nuclear weapons leaves little room for delay. This option will be handcuffed if Saddam acquires nuclear weapons; the prospect of the 101st Airborne invading a nuclear state is unfathomable.

Critical logistical support from the Middle East has been secured. Eighteen European heads of state support the United States, as do Australia, Japan, India and others. A second Security Council resolution authorizing force should certainly be sought; however, if it receives the requisite nine votes but is nonetheless vetoed by a state asserting its visions of grandeur, who then would be acting unilaterally?

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Above all, this is not a ploy for a rudimentary natural resource, the abundance of which in other parts of the world — places far less dangerous to attack — should confirm the absurdity of claims about American imperialism. A recent Rice University study debunked the notion that invading Iraq would reap enormous profits for Western powers. Oil conspiracy theorists assume that the United States would invest more than $100 billion in a region for the sake of boosting world oil production by a mere 1.3 percent, losing money and risking the lives of its own citizens simultaneously.

Certain threats to international security respond only to force. Saddam's reckless history indicates that he is one of them. Our armed forces are rightly going to unprecedented lengths to ensure that an attack would be swift and sparing to the Iraqi people. A successful military operation will obligate the U.S., along with its allies, to rebuild Iraq for the millions of civilians who will have been liberated.

This process will be extensive and costly. But without a viable alternative, we are left with no option but to undertake this endeavor with force and resolve.

Vipin Narang is a first-year Marshall Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford University. Brad Simmons is a Politics major from San Jose, Calif.