Seven passes in 16 seconds. Two curls, three hard cuts toward the hoop, one hand-off, two fadeouts to the three-point line. Finally, the possession ends with an open three-pointer touching nothing but net.
It all looks so complicated to fans and reporters. And it certainly did to the Texas men's basketball team when Princeton ran through this exact sequence on its opening possession in a 56-46 win over the Longhorns in December, 1998. But ask Tiger head coach John Thompson '88 to explain the secret behind Princeton's vaunted "system" and he'll be quick to dispel the misconceptions.
"Too much attention has been given to the 'Princeton system' and to what we do on the court," Thompson said. "We've had a lot of success here because we've had great players.
"It's not rocket science," Thompson added.
To most members of the national media, the Princeton offense is a novelty of the past that they are fortunate to come across now and then — much like finding a quaint antique at a yard sale.
While in one sense, the Princeton offense is like a family heirloom — in that it has been passed down through several coaching generations — it is anything but antiquated.
Contrary to popular belief, the Tigers' offensive system encourages creativity and choice — and most importantly, requires highly skilled players for its proper execution.
One of the unique features of the Princeton offense is that instead of requiring players to learn specific plays, the players learn the variety of options of a certain set, and then make subsequent decisions themselves.
"[In] our offense, we try to teach guys how to play instead of teaching plays," Thompson said. "[We] give them the freedom to do what they want and make their own decisions once they get out there."
On most teams, there are set plays in which a guard makes a pass, a player runs to a specific side and sets a screen in a certain spot so another player can set up for a shot. And that's it. A couple passes, a few seconds and one shot — whether good or bad is launched toward the basket. There might be two or three options — maximum.
In Princeton's offense, there can be two or three options for each player — every five seconds.
This is why the Tigers are so difficult to prepare for — even for the best coaches. Their offense involves a degree of flexibility that, when run properly, can take a defense completely by surprise, especially if that defense has already been chasing the Tigers for 25 seconds on a given possession.
Patience is the final crucial virtue of the Princeton attack. Rarely is the offense simply abandoned in favor of a one-on-one dribbling sequence with the shot clock — or game clock — running out.
The famous play (diagram on page 12) on which Gabe Lewullis '99 scored to defeat UCLA in 1996 was, in truth, a simple cut along the baseline. After an entire possession of passing and cutting, though, that was enough to fool the Bruins' Charles O'Bannon.
Once a play begins, even the Tigers themselves might not know what the ideal result will be. It depends entirely on what Princeton sees in the defense — and what the Tigers see one another doing.
For example, the Princeton center, when positioned between the foul line and the three-point line, is often used to set a high screen for a three-point shooter behind the top of the key. If that player cuts to the basket, however, the center might need to fade to the top of the key himself to receive a pass. Of course, if the center finds his defender is overplaying the passing lane and denying him the ball, he might cut back-door himself, after the first cutter has vacated the lane.
All these options are pursued over the course of about a four-second period, so split-second decision-making is imperative.
Another common set Princeton fans are no doubt familiar with places the center at the foul line, the point guard above the top of the key, with wings on either side of the center. The diagrams below show some of the many options that this set offers.
In that 1998 game against Texas, Princeton ran several offensive sequences from this formation. After using one variation (Diagram One) throughout the first half, the Tigers caught the Longhorns completely off guard in the second half by passing to the cutter on the opposite side from which the point guard went (Diagram Two). The cue was the direction in which the point guard moved after his initial pass and the positioning of the defense, as always.
"The hardest part is that it's not specifics," Thompson said. "The hardest part is that you do have a choice."
That's the hardest part for the offense, when players are first learning it. Once they do, though, that flexibility and adaptability becomes the burden of the opposition.